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Introduction 
Thé popularization of digital téchnologiés has léd to thé émérgéncé in récént 
yéars of a néw catégory of playérs: digital platforms. Théir incéption 
constitutés a radical socio-économic transformation. In thé span of oné 
génération, thé majority of thé world’s population has adoptéd thé néw digital 
sérvicés offéréd by téchnological companiés, most of thém born in thé digital 
éra, during thé last two décadés. Ovér thé last yéars, thé platforms théy 
créatéd havé éxpériéncéd uniqué growth in économic history, léading to thé 
world largést corporations, both in térms of numbér of cliénts or usérs, as in 
térms of capital. Applé, Alphabét, Microsoft, Amazon, Téncént, Alibaba, 
Facébook havé réplacéd crudé oil corporations as thé top tén markét 
capitalizations1. 
What is thé ground of such a succéss, and what aré its conséquéncés? Thé 
révolutionary charactér of thé platforms liés in thé way in which théy 
transform thé activity of intérmédiation. Indééd, thé néw digital sérvicés théy 
offér, although covéring a widé variéty of séctors of activity, havé oné ésséntial 
point in common: théy énsuré intérmédiation with algorithmic méans. 
Intérmédiation is an ésséntial activity for thé opération of any sociéty. Thé rolé 
of intérmédiariés is to connéct péoplé with éach othér, or with thé goods and 
sérvicés théy nééd or which may bé of intérést to thém. 
Far from béing néw, thé activity of intérmédiation is énsuréd in all séctors, in 
various forms. At thé individual lévél, résorting to caré, obtaining a bank loan, 
arranging a trip, and moré générally purchasing goods aré all common 
activitiés that involvé intérmédiariés: such as banks, shops, librariés, travél 
agénciés, néws organizations, postal sérvicés. On a broadér scalé, intérnational 
tradé, thé éxploitation of raw matérials or thé production of manufacturéd 
goods aré all séctors baséd on a sét of intérmédiation activitiés. 
Why digital platforms révolutionizé intérmédiation? For a véry simplé réason. 
Indééd, it is basically an information procéssing opération. It is thé 
information availablé to thé intérmédiation opérators which énablés to 
idéntify thé possiblé matchés bétwéén producérs and consumérs of goods or 
sérvicés for instancé. Thé opérators théréforé havé to know at bést thé actors 
1 As of the third semester of 2017. 
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involvéd, both producérs and consumérs. Thé quantity of knowlédgé in théir 
posséssion and thé quality of thé analytical procéssing théy aré capablé of aré 
fundaméntal to implémént a rélévant and éfféctivé connéction. 
Algorithms and digital systéms could havé béén uséd to imprové or rationalisé 
an éxisting activity, without affécting much thé organisation of sociéty. But 
things évolvéd on a rathér différént path. Thé déploymént of digital 
téchnologiés séts up a néw social framéwork. It promotés thé connéction to 
thé nétwork of an incréasing numbér of péoplé as wéll as objécts, dévicés and 
machinés, and thé gradual digitization of thé réal world in its dynamics. Thé 
éxpanding connéction togéthér with thé rapid progréssion of computing 
powér opén néw possibilitiés for thé massivé accumulation of data on human 
activitiés and its procéssing, which is now commonly référréd to as “big data”. 
This transformation, as wé will séé, is radical in thé sénsé that it léads to néw 
objécts, néw classés, and néw rélationships bétwéén thé objécts. Thé 
framéwork in which wé aré uséd to think about thé social and political 
organization is at staké. At thé géopolitical lévél, thé concépt of nation-staté 
with its associatéd sovéréignty nééds to bé révisitéd with émérging compléx 
dépéndénciés léading to néw powér rélationships. At thé social lévél, thé 
traditional division of labour and its organisation is shakén by néw norms as 
wéll as néw modés of intéraction énforcéd by platforms. 
Intéréstingly this global movémént sééms to bé shaking thé foundations of our 
organization, at all lévéls, whilé néw constraints aré émérging from our 
“natural énvironmént”, with natural écosystéms imposing tightér conditions 
on human activitiés, to say thé léast (Barnosky et al. 2012), rising gréat 
uncértainty on our capacity to adapt to thésé changés. Timé to rémémbér 
Marx’s statémént: “Mankind thus inévitably séts itsélf only such tasks as it is 
ablé to solvé, sincé closér éxamination will always show that thé problém itsélf 
arisés only whén thé matérial conditions for its solution aré alréady présént or 
at léast in thé coursé of formation” (Marx 1859). 
To a cértain éxtént, platforms rély on thé samé matérial as modérn 
govérnménts: data. Statistics is thé art of modélling thé “things of statés” with 
thé appropriaté mathématical tools, in ordér to influéncé thém (Foucault 
2007). So aré social data, which fééd statistics (Désrosiérés 1999). Statistics 
allowéd a néw political rationality baséd on norms. Théy contributéd to définé 
normal lifé éxpéctancy, unémploymént ratés, étc. and influéncé political action 
to guidé béhaviours towards thésé norms. During thé last two cénturiés, thé 
capacity of govérnménts to obtain précisé knowlédgé of théir population has 
régularly béén upgradéd, with incréasingly détailéd cénsusés and 
téchnological improvéménts such as thé digitization of cénsus in thé 1940’s 
for instancé. Thé raisé of lifé quality and éxpéctancy is a diréct bénéfit of data 
colléction and procéssing which support public héalth policiés for instancé. 
This short papér aims at showing thé méchanisms at play allowing thé risé of 
actors that act on thé réal world by solély manipulating information. Wé thén 
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show that not only doés it introducé néw playérs, among thé most powérful 
onés, not only doés it condémn many actors of thé old world to décay, but 
moré importantly, it léads to a néw socio-économic organisation with déép 
political and éthical conséquéncés. 
The Rise of Pure Digital Actors 
History will remember that it is the platforms that first took advantage to such 
an extent of the potential of digital data through intermediation systems, 
which are all based on essentially the same architecture. They first use data 
that is produced outside the system: Web pages for the search engine, or 
personal data for social networks. By analysing and transforming these data, 
platforms are able to develop services. The use of these services by users in 
turn generates new data, traces of use, which in turn enables them to generate 
new services, including generic services, such as search engine trends, and 
personalized services, which exploit the fine knowledge that the platforms 
have of their users. 
The accumulation of data thus allows platforms to offer new intermediation 
services, such as search engines or social media, unthinkable without digital 
technologies. These services enable intermediation to be carried out more 
effectively than by traditional actors. On the one hand, platforms have data 
that legacy actors do not have access to. On the other hand, these data and 
their exploitation allow platforms to offer a degree of personalization of 
service never reached before. 
The success of platforms lies on their mastery of data technologies. But it 
would lead to miss fundamental aspects to reduce their success to technology. 
In addition to technological mastery, the platforms have succeeded in bringing 
about new economic models. It is important to understand that the operation 
of linking suppliers and consumers of goods or services is the basis of the 
economy of platforms. Economists speak of two-sided markets, that is to say 
markets associating two groups of actors whose activities are made possible 
by the network (Rochet-Tirole 2003). Unlike a traditional company that offers 
products or services, platforms produce essentially nothing. It does not mean 
though that ensuring the digital service is easy. The core of their added value 
is the facilitation of exchanges between users, companies, providing a 
common interface: the platform. 
Platforms at first take existing data, essentially accessible to all. Somehow, 
they propose a new way to look at these data, and in fact suggest a new vision 
of the world, a new way to consider relationships and dependencies between 
objects, by considering the data. That leads to a new grammar, that is new 
rules to describe the relationships between objects. Interestingly, the 
Anthropocene (Crutzen 2006), that is the new geological era in which we live, 
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has been promoted by a new way to look at the world, triggered by data, 
where the relationship between humans and nature is reconsidered (Steffen-
Crutzen-McNeill 2007). Platforms are transforming and taking control of the 
exchange of information between all actors, at the heart of the 
interdependencies of socio-economic systems together with natural 
ecosystems. They are the beating heart of the exchange of information of 
contemporary society at a global scale. 
An interesting demonstration of the switchover of our economies towards 
platforms is given by the industry of mobile terminals, such as smartphones. 
Nokia and Blackberry that dominated the market, quickly lost their 
supremacy to the benefit of Apple and Android terminals, not because both 
are based on better technologies or more advanced features but because they 
rely on an open ecosystem, open to external developers who allow these tools 
to evolve continuously. 
The economy of platforms depends on two markets simultaneously (Parker-
Van Alstyne-Choudary 2016). Platforms indeed pursue two essential 
complementary objectives. On the one hand, they ensure a direct link with 
their basic users in order to be able to collect data on their activity. For 
platforms, the control of these data is central, it determines the quality of the 
services offered to the users. In addition, it allows them to monetize their 
audience with other companies. On the other hand, they seek to attract into 
their ecosystem, services offered by third-party actors. Openness to external 
applications is essential to offer a variety of services that meet the unbounded 
potential needs of users. In short, the challenge for the platforms is to develop 
both sides at the same time, and benefit from network effect. 
A key factor in the power of platforms is precisely the “snowball éfféct” that 
can be triggered once the number of users increases. This growth tends to 
accelerate due to a phenomenon of increasing returns: the more users the 
platform has and the better it is able to offer them an improved service for the 
same price, which attracts new users, and so on in a positive feedback loop. 
This virtuous loop is simple to understand: the more users there are, the more 
data there is, the more relevant the intermediation system is. The more users 
there are, the more the platform attracts third-party services; The more third-
party services and the more likely the platform is to attract usérs… This is the 
network effect. 
This phenomenon of increasing returns is essential to understand the dizzying 
growth of certain platforms in recent years and the concentration, which is 
now the rule at the time of digital intermediation. Indeed, in almost all sectors 
of activity where digital platforms are involved, one platform dominates the 
sector, with a much higher number of users than its competitors. 
Intermediation activities carried out by platforms spread across multiple 
sectors. In doing so, they challenge the position of traditional actors. 
Intermediation platforms profoundly change the economic organization 
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because they have the capacity to “disintérmédiaté” traditional actors, that is 
to say, to divest them of their connection with their “customérs”. The 
traditional territories bounding distinct activity sectors are progressively 
disappearing. This seriously shakes their business model, while in some cases 
it even eliminates their raison d’êtré. This ability to slip between users and 
service providers is due to two things. On the one hand, platforms are able to 
offer services that focus on consumer value rather than on the means by 
which it can be produced. In the transportation sector, for example, the 
service consists of a given trip at a given time, not the choice of a means of 
transportation such as train or plane. On the other hand, one of the essential 
properties of platforms is to bring consumers and suppliers up to the same 
level by offering new tools to the former: a personalized service allowing 
access to the offer that best suits everyone, together with recommendation 
option that allows users to express their level of appreciation, which 
translates into a new form of service quality certification by the user 
community. 
The Fall of Traditional Territories 
Traditional grounds of the economy are strongly disrupted, leading to new 
spaces, abolishing traditional borders (Atluri-Dietz-Henke 2017). The 
“disruptivé” power of intermediation platforms on the rest of the economy 
invites us to revisit all sectors of activity from the angle of intermediation in 
order to identify the actors that could be impacted. All traditional services that 
interplay in one way or another between users and services will be affected by 
digital intermediation systems. Sectors as diverse as education, the press, 
health and taxation deserve special attention. They clearly establish a 
relationship between students and professors, journalists and readers, 
caregivers and patients, taxpayers and citizens. They are all to varying degrees 
affected by the irruption of the platforms. 
Ubér’s well-known example shows that a platform can act as a direct 
intermediary between passengers and individual carriers, such as taxis, by 
abstaining from companies that manage fleets of vehicles. It should be noted 
though that Uber draws its strength from the very limits of the economic 
model of taxis. On the one hand, the quality of service of taxis is generally 
mediocre due to a phenomenon of organized rarity. On the other hand, the 
right to engage in taxi activity involves the acquisition of an expensive 
licénsé — in Paris around 300 K€, while in New York, it is around US$ 1 
million — which tends to burden the cost of service to the customer. With 
Uber, this cost disappears, which partly explains why taxi corporations are the 
first to be severely disrupted. 
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It is at this level, the mastering of intermediation, that one of the deepest 
impact of the digital revolution will take place, with a very radical disruptive 
power, the one that will cause the greatest collapse of companies and more 
generally all sorts of players including public administrations, from the old 
world. It will affect in a similar way, territories, such as a metropolis or 
nations as well, simply by switching to a global platform activities, and in 
particular those that enforce behavioural norms formerly carried out by local 
actors. 
Geography constitutes an interesting angle to consider digital activity. 
Platforms are remarkable for their ability to carry out intermediation between 
actors without having to be physically present on the territories where these 
actors are located. Platforms rely, of course, on physical infrastructures 
formed by data centres as well as communication systems, but these are not 
related to the “intérmédiatéd activity.” Platforms intervention is based on the 
gathering of data from the territories. They have in general no direct 
interaction with the physical world in which the activity takes place, where 
the drivers work for instance, but they have a clear representation of the 
space, such as the cities (Calo-Rosenblat 2017), in real time with their flow of 
traffic and commercial exchanges among others. 
In short, the disruptive impact of the platforms lies in the fact that they offer 
an intermediation disjoint from the production of goods or services of the 
physical world, and with a higher efficiency than that offered by traditional 
field intermediaries. It is in essence neither good nor bad, but it changes the 
rules of the game. Platforms are taking shares of territories and their socio-
economic control in a somehow orthogonal way. They redesign the sectors, 
and reconfigure the geography. 
The other geographic specificity of the platform economy is that platforms 
exercise their global business from a handful of decision centres around the 
world. Few countries have given rise to large platforms, most of them are 
American and Chinese (Grumbach 2013). The concentration is even strong 
inside countries, with an accumulation in the San Francisco Bay Area for the 
US, and in three major places in China. Currently, platforms capture from 
some restricted geographic areas a remarkable part of the growth in the 
activity of local actors everywhere, not to mention the reduction in local 
taxation revenue that may result from this capture of activity combined with 
the, widely contested, tax optimization strategies of platforms (OECD 2015). 
The uneven distribution of the digital actors on the surface of the planet is 
striking. Most of them are concentrated in the USA, China, Russia, Japan, 
Korea, as well as some other Asian countries. No major platform has been 
developed on the European continent. In fact, neither the most popular 
devices and their hardware chips, nor the main popular softwares running 
them, such as operating systems, are developed in Europe, a situation which 
contrast with the technological capacity of the continent in traditional sectors. 
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Catching up policies for territories without platforms might lead to very 
different strategies (Weber 2017), and rely on different ideological 
conceptions. 
A first response to the concerns raised by the dominance of American 
platforms could be to give Europe the means to develop platforms able to 
challenge the US platforms used by European residents. This issue is crucial 
for two reasons. On the one hand, having large European actors would make it 
possible to ensure that a greater share of the value and jobs created by the 
economy of the platforms is anchored on European soil. On the other hand, the 
question of regulating the activity of platforms flying the European flag would 
arise in a very different setting as today, where regulations mostly apply to 
foreign corporations. This second point is essential because the stakes of 
regulation of the platforms go well beyond economic questions. 
Territories need to deal with this shift of power. It must be noted that the rise 
of platforms is in many respects an irreversible mutation. The main reason is 
that they provide services of unsurpassed performance and depth, and 
potentially at a lower price than traditional services. The success of the 
platforms with the general public is first and foremost due to this quality 
factor. This point needs to be emphasized. Even if platforms today have a 
disruptive social impact they cannot be considered simply as yet another 
economic and social scourge. They could contribute to the best as well as the 
worse, but they have become a reality. The challenge is not to create dikes 
against the development of platforms, but to realize that they tend to upset the 
creation of value in the economy by proposing modalities of intermediation 
centred on the quality of service. The underlying principle relies on the strong 
believe that data should be harvested and used at its highest potential. In fact 
the “spirit" of the “digital” shares a lot with the spirit of the early capitalism 
(Weber 1904). 
The relationships between the cyberspace and States has been controversial 
from the beginning, with a dominant libertarian vision in the early days, best 
illustrated with Barlow’s declaration of independence (Barlow 1996). But 
since most of the digital industry has been developed after the 9.11 terror 
attack in 2001, issues related to national security and surveillance gave a 
peculiar historical twist to their development. State surveillance programs are 
making increasing use of platforms data, while this results in complex trade-
offs (Butler-Hidyegi 2015). 
The Shift of the Political Power 
The rise of platforms also induces a political revolution. The growth of 
platforms triggers key policy issues for at least two reasons. First of all, 
platforms are part of a process of horizontalization of society that takes place 
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to the detriment of organizations operating in a vertical mode, such as the 
State. This logic of horizontality arises with the possibilities of connection and 
interaction that digital networks offer to individuals. Moreover, the activity of 
the platforms is deployed according to a mode of operation which differs 
radically from the large multinationals of goods or services in the traditional 
economic sectors. Indeed, the later penetrate the territories from the top, they 
must comply with a binding framework and, in case of conflict, negotiate with 
the authorities of the country. Conversely, platforms penetrate territories 
from the bottom, that is to say by directly reaching the citizens who adopt 
their services without restriction. 
This mode of direct relation to local users allowed by remote intermediation 
has the consequence that the contradictions that may appear between the 
authorities and the platforms arise a posteriori once the platforms already 
have a significant presence on the territory and are adopted by a non-
negligible part of the population. In this context, it may appear somewhat 
politically risky, in any case complex for a territory to oppose the activities of 
platforms on its territory. The ban of Uber in London in the fall 2017 
illustrates very well this situation (Topham 2017). Uber which claims that 3.5 
million people have downloaded its app and used it at least once in the three 
months preceding the ban, got the support of 850,000 people signing a 
petition asking to revoke that decision. 
The second element that has an eminently political resonance is that 
platforms are now taking over an ever increasing amount of data on human 
activities. Mastering the data means mastering information, and mastering 
information is a radical leverage of power. The data collected by the 
intermediation operators are incredibly rich. They enable their owners to 
develop a real-time knowledge of all the interactions between actors 
throughout the world. We are moving towards a paradoxical situation where 
platforms, although intervening at a distance, tend to accumulate information 
on the activities of population on territories that are more extensive than 
those available to local authorities (Faravelon-Grumbach 2016). Android or 
iOS have more geolocation sensors and data processing facilities than any 
administration to predict traffic for instance. Online sales platforms are able to 
produce economic statistics in real time. Alibaba does so for China. It is clear 
that the relative share of data produced by platforms increases to the 
detriment of that of public actors, whose data sources are both slow and 
costly. 
The decline of the state supremacy in the control of information in its territory 
is growing. The management of very detailed maps of the territory, 
augmented with all sorts of data on activities, economic, transportation, etc. 
and including pictures constitute a good example of the rise of platforms in 
the knowledge of the activity of the territory of a temporal accuracy 
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unmatched by governments (Siqueira-Leite-Beerli 2017). Their relative share 
of such data has thus declined continuously since the turn of the Millennium. 
New frontiers emerge on a different dimension than the geographic ones 
separating nation-states. Of course it would be imaginable to impose the 
geographic frontiers to the cyberspace, but it is neither what has happened 
not what can be envisioned for the future. The Balkanization of the Internet 
into partly independent systems difficult to reach from different territories 
seems hard to achieve (Daskal 2015). More interestingly, a different geometry 
is expanding, with new dimensions, allowing new power relationships 
between objects, in which battles of the future started take place, at all levels, 
economic supremacy, cultural influence, as well as military dominance. 
The globalisation of the world economy, which resulted from the 
implementation of the principles of a liberal economy, facilitated the 
movement of people, goods and capital. It gave increasing facilities to private 
corporations to expand globally, while decreasing the power of governments 
to control them. Free movements of goods and capital constrained 
governments to adopt local rules that compete at a global scale. Such a 
competition progressively changed the political balance between concrete 
factual data and abstract political principles (Ostrom 2015). Numbers have 
acquired an increasing political legitimacy (Hansen-Porter 2017), at the same 
level as political principles, which lead various political scientists to speak 
about “govérnancé by numbérs” (Supiot 2015). Europe is again in a peculiar 
position since it depends widely on numbers produced by foreign agencies, 
much like it depends from foreign digital platforms (Verschraegen 2015). 
The second trend, which is also calling for more data, is the desire to have 
more transparency and accountability of public action. Political systems of 
Western democracies, as well as other political systems, are under the 
pressure of public opinion for an increased efficiency and reliability in the 
political sphere. Pierre Rosanvallon speaks of “countér-démocracy”, that is 
new forms of democratic powers, taking shape “in the age of distrust” 
(Rosanvallon 2014). He distinguishes three counter democratic powers: 
oversight, prevention and judgment that strongly rely on a new “utopia” of 
transparency. Therefore, evaluating public policies, and making public 
administration data open to the citizens are new political trends that 
governments have to take into account (Collmann-Matei 2016). At the same 
time, the data of platforms is mostly inaccessible to third parties for reasons 
ranging from ethical to commercial. 
In July 2013, while the UK was organizing the G8 meeting, a rather innovative 
open data charter was proposed and signed by all participants. Its ambition 
covers a large spectrum of simple objectives ranging from politics to economy, 
from better governance to increased development opportunities. The charter 
is really ambitious when it asserts the principle of opening all data by default, 
apart from essentially three categories of data that need protection related to 
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national security, privacy, or intellectual property issues2. The charter has 
been followed by many decisions, at all level of governance, including 
directives of the European Commission, such as the directive on the re-use of 
public sector information. 
If there is a sort of consensus on the benefits of data openness, the economic 
impact on the local economy is unclear, unless these data are not exclusively 
exploited by large foreign platforms? Open data could be more directly linked 
to support the emergence of platforms coming from the territory? For 
example, in China public authorities organize competitions to access the data. 
This allows them to retain control over the economic valuation of public data, 
and to better control the share of roles between public bodies and companies 
in order to manage cities for instance. 
Towards a Complex Biopolitical System 
This trends fragilises the legitimacy to act and to regulate that the public 
power historically held on its territory. Platforms might soon be able to offer 
services nowadays provided by public administrations, but in a much more 
effective way, merely because of their control of the data relating to the 
service and their ability to enlist local user communities in the management of 
the city for instance. This is suggested again by the example of Uber, whose 
capacity could go beyond the management of taxis to more global issues for 
the city. Similarly, the use of data is likely to play an increasing role in societal 
choices, particularly in a context where optimizing the use of resources will 
become an increasingly unavoidable environmental imperative. What better 
way, for example, than a platform to manage the electricity market by 
mediating large number of decentralized and unreliable producers and the 
mass of consumers? 
One can wonder what platforms share with public services. In some ways 
platforms are very similar to public services. They provide services essential 
to the daily life of a large part of the population, as fundamental as energy 
supply, telecommunications or transport, for example. These services 
essentially respect the main principles of public service: continuity of service, 
equality in access and non-discrimination of users, as well as evolution and 
adaptability. Of course, a major difference between these new services and 
public services is the fact that they are deployed by platforms with an 
essentially commercial focus, and off the ground. This configuration will 
necessarily entail a redefinition of the respective rights and duties of public 
authorities and private enterprises. 
2 Text of the Charter available at https://opendatacharter.net/. 
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It seems though that the normative power of platforms can only be 
strengthened in the future, to allow for more complexity resulting from more 
dependencies between socio-economic actors. As Laurence Lessig (2006) 
stated it very elegantly, code is law, the rules governing society will 
increasingly rely on algorithmic processes. 
Of course, local communities still have certain means of pressure to negotiate 
with platforms the modalities of their activity on territories. Given that 
regulations are bound to local or national scale, the crucial issue at the level of 
a territory such as a metropolis, remains a pro-active economic policy to bring 
out real competitors on the local data and local connection with people. This is 
the key, as shown for example by the city of Seoul which blocked the arrival of 
Uber thus allowing a local competitor to emerge. There is probably little 
benefit in preventing the activity of a given platform, but ensuring a 
reasonable balance of power with platforms over a territory will be a topic of 
increasing importance. 
How can this be achieved is not a simple question though. Some of the reasons 
of the inability of various countries to create local digital champions have been 
documented. In particular, the missing link with venture capital to meet the 
need of the accelerated growth of digital start-ups to avoid the classic 
alternative between failure or salvation by a US firm which buys the 
technology or the network of users if not both. There is also the question of 
the legislation relating to the digital economy, which takes complex contours 
at European level and might arguably hinder the deployment of European 
players throughout the continental market. 
Most of the political and economic elites have not been trained to face the 
economic, social or political stakes of the digital economy as it unfolds in 
recent years. Various territories remain on backward battles, trying to 
preserve an untenable status quo for existing actors which, whether we like it 
or not, are destined to adapt or disappear, as well as rules, which are difficult 
to maintain in the digital era such as the right to be forgotten. 
If Google and other platforms dominate some sectors today, many other 
markets remain to be explored, in health, education, energy, etc. If Europe 
does not take control of the intermediation that is being built in these sectors, 
it will lose the ability to anchor and share the economic value created in these 
markets, as well as may be more importantly, to contribute to define the new 
norms. Note that this question arises directly for the legacy companies that 
historically dominated their sectors: how to retain the primacy on the data 
related to the markets on which they intervene and how to make the 
exploitation of these data leverage their offer to meet the quality 
requirements imposed by the platform model? Very few corporations seem to 
address this issue with a real understanding of the consequences. General 
Electric (2016) is among the pioneers to massively invest in this translation in 
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a new setting, with the development of an operating system for the industrial 
environment. 
The confrontation between platforms and public administration is not 
balanced. Platforms have the capacity to raise billions and recruit intelligence 
at a global level, while States and local administrations are forced to cut their 
spending, at the expense of their ability to face these new issues, and rely 
mostly on large, locally recruited, aging staff. Local administrations capacity to 
apprehend markets, economic models and technologies in the digital economy 
remains limited. Another important gap between platforms and public 
authorities concerns the dependency from the regulatory framework. Where 
platforms sometimes deliberately free themselves from the rules in force 
because they are convinced that they will eventually evolve in their favour 
sooner or later, public organizations spend considerable energy verifying that 
their action is in the nails legally, which of course happens to the detriment of 
their agility. Clearly, if a metropolis intends to promote the development of a 
local ecosystem conducive to the emergence of the platforms of tomorrow, it 
is crucial for it to give itself the organizational, human and financial means to 
do so. 
One can legitimately wonder why these changes happen so fast that the ruling 
class seems to be taken by surprise and unable to react appropriately. What is 
at stake is a completely different way of handling information, and the 
capacity to do so most often independently of the physical world. That is to 
say the capacity to act on the socio-economic system by only playing at the 
information level, from remote positions in space. Such a manipulation of 
information results in an increase of the interdependency between actors, 
accessing to an unlimited network of interactions. By doing so, part of the 
verticality of the social organisation collapses. The frontiers between 
territories, the division between sectors are weakened, while the intricacy of 
the dependencies increase. 
These changes raise considerable political as well as ethical questions. Are 
they leading to a world which is better governed, and in whose benefit? Are 
the resources going to be more evenly shared or on the contrary are 
inequalities going to increase (O’Néil 2016)? Will the natural ecosystem 
continue to deteriorate? There has been a considerable interest for the 
protection of individuals, the traces of their activities, under the concept of 
privacy3. But beyond the rights of individual, the new forms of dealing with 
information induce changes in the political organisation, with the emergence 
of new global powers and the disruption of established ones with new threats 
such as attacks on the information system itself, whose source might be hard 
to identify, and with consequences of unpredictable range. 
3 Many conferences among which the annual meeting on “Computers, Privacy and 
Data Protéction” in Brussels. 
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While the digital revolution occurs, the planetary conditions evolve towards a 
deteriorating environment for humanity, which will require profound changes 
in the political organisation, to facilitate the capacity to face collectively global 
challenges. States have shown their restricted ability to agree on common 
objectives and to implement them. They were not really designed for that 
purpose. Many of the means to act on the natural ecosystem require in fact to 
abolish existing barriers, to be able to take into account all interactions 
between seemingly independent sectors. This is particularly true for the 
preservation of the biosphere for instance. The capacity to govern from the 
information sphere could offer new means to balance production and 
consumption while taking into account all interdependencies with our planet. 
Platforms have demonstrated their potential for a better sharing of resources, 
although it is still unclear if their current influence on society triggers a better 
distribution of resources. But in any case, the adaptation of socio-economic 
systems to the new planetary boundaries (Rockström et al. 2009) will be done 
with and through digital platforms, and new modes of interactions (Foucault-
Davidson-Burchell 2008), that make extensive use of information. Although 
the literature focuses mainly on the protection of individuals, the role of 
digital platforms in the transition of society towards sustainable politics is 
probably one of the most serious and complex ethical question of the digital 
era. 
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Digital Platforms: A New Grammar for Territories? 
Abstract. Digital platforms aré réshaping thé géométry of thé world. 
Théir widé adoption by thé population worldwidé for an incréasing 
numbér of activitiés, confér thém a dominant position, which challéngés 
éstablishéd powérs. Théir control ovér thé global flow of data and théir 
algorithmic tréatmént léads to néw asymmétriés of powér. Néw systéms 
émérgé, that unliké thé Wéstphalian Statés do not corréspond to térritoriés 
on a map, but to compléx nétworks controlling séctors of activitiés at a global 
scalé. It is a réal challéngé and a nécéssity to réinvént a grammar of 
térritoriés, to bé ablé to grasp thé néw objécts and théir dépéndénciés, and 
addréss thé rélatéd issués of social justicé and sustainablé intéraction with 
our planét. 
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